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1. Abstract & Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
1.1. Abstract 
The nature of moral judgments has received considerable attention not only in philosophy 
and psychology but lately in neuroscience as well. There are two major paradigms that 
consider moral judgments either mainly rational, or as emotional-/ intuition-based processes. 
Relatively recent neuroimaging studies revealed however that both rational and emotional 
processes may support moral judgments. In line with these results, this doctoral thesis 
focused on ways that could better elucidate the supporting cognitive and/ or emotional 
processes of moral judgments. In a first study, moral judgments were compared to esthetic 
judgments by employing a whole-brain analysis. This idea was based on the philosophical 
and the psychological frameworks of moral sense theory and social intuitionist model 
respectively. Both models view moral judgments akin to esthetic judgments, as decision-
making processes based on emotions/ subjective feelings. The fMRI data suggest a common 
denominator between the judgment modalities - a network involved in both cognitive and 
emotion processing. However, moral judgments seem to rely on an additional social 
component. In a second fMRI study, the two main paradigms of moral research were 
investigated. A main difference between the paradigms is the perspective the participants 
have towards the moral stimuli (i.e. first- or third-perspective). The fMRI data revealed that 
neural differences may emerge, and that they may be related to the so-called “actor-observer 
bias”, a tendency to attribute one’s own behavior to the situation, and the behaviors of others 
to their inner characteristics. Several hypotheses are put forth, which try to explain the 
complex neural mechanisms of moral decision-making.  
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1.2. Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Natur moralischer Urteile hat nicht nur in der Philosophie und Psychologie, sondern 
neuerdings auch in den Neurowissenschaften beträchtliche Aufmerksamkeit erhalten. Es gibt 
zwei Haupt-Paradigmen, die moralische Urteile entweder als vorwiegend rationale, oder als 
emotionale und auf Intuition basierende Prozesse betrachten. Bildgebende Studien haben 
jedoch gezeigt, dass moralische Urteile sowohl durch rationale als auch durch emotionale 
Prozesse beschrieben werden können. Auf diesen Befunden aufbauend ist die vorliegende 
Doktorarbeit einer vertiefenden Untersuchung der zugrundeliegenden neuro-kognitiven und 
emotionalen Prozesse moralischer Urteile gewidmet. In einer ersten Studie wurden 
moralische und ästhetische Urteile durch den Einsatz einer „whole brain“ Analyse 
verglichen. Dieser Idee liegen philosophische und psychologische Hypothesen der „Moral 
Sense Theorie“ und dem „Social Intuitionist Model“ zu Grunde. Die fMRT-Daten legen 
einen gemeinsamen Nenner der beiden Urteilsarten nahe; es konnte ein Netzwerk identifiziert 
werden, das sowohl für kognitive und als auch für emotionale Verarbeitung zuständig ist. Bei 
moralischen Urteilen werden allerdings weitere neuronale Areale kooptiert, die eine soziale 
Komponente des Urteilens repräsentieren. In einer zweiten fMRT-Studie wurden zentrale 
Paradigmen der moralischen Forschung untersucht. Ein Hauptunterschied zwischen den 
Paradigmen ist die Perspektive der Teilnehmer auf die moralischen Stimuli (d.h. der ersten 
oder dritten Perspektive). Die fMRT-Daten legen nahe, dass Unterschiede in neuronalen 
Aktivierungen auf den sogenannten „Actor-Observer-Bias“ zurückgeführt werden können. 
Dieser Bias stellt eine Tendenz dar, das eigene Verhalten jeweils der äußeren Situation 
zuzuschreiben, und das Verhalten der anderen jeweils deren persönlichen Merkmalen. Auf 
der Grundlage neuro-kognitiver und psychologischer Hypothesen werden die komplexen 
neuronalen Mechanismen der moralischen Entscheidungsfindung zu erklären versucht. 
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2. Theoretical foundation 
 
2.1. Moral judgments in neuroscience 
The debate about the nature of moral judgments began in philosophy, reaching climax with 
David Hume and Immanuel Kant (Zangwill, 2010). One of the promoters of moral sense 
theory, David Hume, regarded moral and esthetic judgments to be similar in nature, and 
defined them as subjective evaluations relying on feelings of pleasure or displeasure (Haidt, 
2001). Immanuel Kant on the other hand, although accepting Hume’s view on esthetic 
judgments, promoted a pure rational notion of morality (e.g. categorical imperative). Thus the 
question followed whether moral judgments were emotion or reason-based? The rational 
view on morality was further promoted in psychology, mainly through Kohlberg’s work, 
based on Piaget’s model of cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1963). This rationalist 
approach dominated up to the development of the social intuitionist model (SIM). SIM is 
based on moral sense theory, in which moral judgments are defined as intuitive evaluations of 
actions or character (good or bad), regarding the values or virtues held by a culture or 
subculture (Haidt, 2001). The two approaches influenced not only theories in philosophy and 
psychology, but also the way in which researchers designed and planned their experiments 
(Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). In other words, different types of stimuli were 
used according to the researchers’ approach. Thus, there are two issues, which could be 
clarified by the employment of neuroscientific measuring techniques (neuroimaging – e.g. 
fMRI): (1) does the brain differentiate between esthetic and moral judgments, and what sort 
of structures are involved in moral decision-making processes – structures related to higher 
cognitive functions or emotional processes, or both? (2) The two major paradigms of research 
in moral judgment (rationalist versus emotionalist) use different stimuli in their experiments, 
is it possible that these approaches lead to different results? 
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2.1.1. Esthetic and moral judgments: a common denominator 
There are several plausible arguments that suggest that esthetic and moral judgments are 
similar in nature. First, they are considered value judgments (Came, 2012), where each value 
can be either positive or negative: beauty and ugliness, and rightness and wrongness. Second, 
both judgment modalities seem to rely on common cognitive processes: cognitive control, 
reward-seeking behavior, representation of actions and sensory imagery (Cupchik, Vartanian, 
Crawley, & Mikulis, 2009; J. D. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). 
Third, in some cases it is difficult to differentiate between the two, since certain aspects of 
esthetic assessment allow moral evaluation (moral assessment of works of art) and vice versa 
(esthetic judgments of moral conduct or character). Nevertheless, certain aspects separate the 
two: on the one hand, esthetic judgments require a direct confrontation with the evaluated 
object/ situation, demand no consistency, and are intrinsic; on the other hand, moral 
judgments often involve other people and/ or action, imply a ranking of alternatives, and are 
more preferential (Came, 2012; Carritt, 1955). 
Both esthetic and moral judgments have elicited strong research interest in neuroscience, 
however almost all studies consider them separately (J. Greene & Haidt, 2002; Jacobsen, 
Schubotz, Hofel, & Cramon, 2006). Only a few number of papers connected the two 
judgment modalities (Tsukiura & Cabeza, 2011; Zaidel & Nadal, 2011). 
A psychological process that supports both esthetic and moral evaluation seems possible, 
although unclear. Relatively recent neuroscientific findings strengthen the hypothesis that 
these evaluations may rely on similar neural foundations (J. D. Greene et al., 2001). A 
number of brain regions involved in the processing of beauty and morality have been 
identified (Tsukiura & Cabeza, 2011; Zaidel & Nadal, 2011). Furthermore, the neural 
correlates found by most studies on morality, revealed the involvement of both cognitive and 
emotional networks (J. D. Greene et al., 2001; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 
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2002; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). Thus, both esthetic and 
moral judgments may rely on networks supporting both cognitive and emotional processes.  
 
2.1.2. Perspectives in moral research 
As mentioned earlier, there are two major approaches in moral research, related to how the 
nature of morality is defined: emotional/ intuitive or rational. Monin and colleagues (2007) 
provide a summary of the way in which the approaches may influence experimental 
paradigms. First, the “rationalists” use moral dilemmas to study moral judgments, while the 
“emotionalists” use strong emotionally laden statements or pictures (moral reactions). 
Second, the psychological processes involved may be different: the focus of moral dilemmas 
is on the decision making process - a conflict between two moral principles, whereas moral 
reactions focus on the emotional reactions of the subjects. Third, moral dilemmas are 
typically presented in a first person perspective (1PP), while moral reactions are presented in 
a third-person perspective (3PP). The perspectives alone (1PP versus 3PP) seem to be 
supported by different brain structures, at least in non-moral contexts. For instance, different 
neural activations were observed for stimuli presented in either 1- or 3PP in non-moral 
visuospatial tasks (Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Furthermore, differences have also been found in 
social non-moral tasks or Theory of Mind – ToM - (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 
2008; Ochsner et al., 2004; Otsuka, Osaka, Yaoi, & Osaka, 2011). 
Additionally, different psychological and neural processes may support the decider’s 
perspective alone (1PP/ 3PP). In this sense, studies in social psychology have repeatedly 
shown that in negative situations there is a tendency to attribute one's own actions (1PP) to 
external causes, while attributing other people's (3PP) behaviors to internal ones, the so-
called "actor-observer bias" (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008). This bias 
may present itself as a crucial issue in moral research, since moral studies generally use 
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negative situations (Takahashi et al., 2008). Thus, the nature of moral judgment may not only 
be very complex and somewhat covert to our research methods, but our own paradigms of 
study may in fact alter the findings. 
2.2. Experimental findings 
 
2.2.1. Neural correlates of esthetic judgments 
Although fMRI methodology has helped us separate even very close-related judgment types 
such as beauty and symmetry (Jacobsen et al., 2006), the neuroscientific literature on 
esthetics seems to be defined by lack of consistency - in other words the results appear to be 
quite heterogeneous. This may be linked to the subjective nature of esthetic evaluation, in 
which cultural norms, education, exposure, but also individual differences play a crucial role. 
Furthermore, personality can act as a predictor as well (Park et al., 2013). In a recent study, 
individual and personal differences of the participants were taken into account (Vessel, Starr, 
& Rubin, 2012). Activation in sensory regions - occipital-temporal - and striatum increased 
linearly with the personal esthetic appreciation, and only for the most moving stimuli 
(according to each subject), did activation in the default-mode network (DMN)  - i.e. anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) - emerge. Activation 
in these regions has been found by other studies as well, although independent of individual 
differences or personal preferences (Cela-Conde et al., 2013). 
 
2.2.2. Neural correlates of moral judgments 
The biological underpinnings of moral judgments have been studied from several angles 
including, but not limited to, the usage of moral dilemmas in both normal and pathological 
populations (J. D. Greene et al., 2001; Pujol et al., 2011), the usage of strong emotionally-
laden moral stimuli in video or picture form, and even the comparison of moral judgments 
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with legal judgments (Schleim, Spranger, Erk, & Walter, 2011). Most researchers on 
neuromorality would concur that there is no such things as a "moral brain", rather moral 
activation encompasses circuitry now classified as part of both the "emotional" and the 
"social brain" (J. Greene & Haidt, 2002; Young & Dungan, 2012). Nevertheless, "typical" 
moral activation has been found in the following structures: orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
MPFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), PCC, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), 
insula, and amygdala (J. Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2005). 
 
2.2.3. Neural correlates of first- and third-person perspective 
Different patterns of neural activity were observed for stimuli presented in either 1- or 3PP in 
non-moral visuospatial tasks (Vogeley & Fink, 2003). During the 1PP situation, neural 
activity was increased in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC), and temporoparietal cortex, bilaterally, whereas in the 3PP situation, neural activity 
was increased in the medial superior parietal and right premotor cortex. Furthermore, 
differences have also been found in social non-moral tasks (which appear to reflect theory of 
mind, ToM), although these results are somewhat less clear. For example, in a study of the 
influence of the person's perspective on ToM, 1- and 3PP-type sentences elicited different 
patterns of neural activation: 1PP-based stimuli yielded greater activation in the caudate 
nucleus, while 3PP-based stimuli evoked increased neural activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The authors related activity in the caudate nucleus to self-focal 
cognition, and DLPFC-activity to ToM (Otsuka et al., 2011). Ames et al. (2008) investigated 
neural processing for 1- and 3PP-based decision-making, and demonstrated that while the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) was activated in both conditions, 1PP-based stimuli 
elicited higher levels of vMPFC activity. The study concluded that consciously adopting 
another person's perspective could prompt neural activity in those networks involved in self- 
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referential cognitive processing. Thus, some degree of overlap between 1- and 3PP is 
possible. 
 
2.3. The present work 
The main focus of my doctoral research intended to elucidate the specific involvement of 
mental processes and their neural underpinnings in moral decision-making. The thesis is 
composed of two sections: (1) Addressing the possible shared neural circuitry of esthetic and 
moral judgments, which could in turn clarify what kind of psychological processes support 
both judgment modalities, and (2) Investigating whether different paradigms of study in 
moral research can lead to different results.  
However, our findings have to be interpreted with care, since the limitations of fMRI, like 
any neurotechnology, must be appreciated (Bao & Pöppel, 2012). 
 
2.3.1. Brief introduction of the thesis: Part I 
In a first study, published as Avram et al. (2013), functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) was employed in order to study, in a within-subjects design, the potential equivalence 
of esthetic and moral judgments. One-line verses from poems and short moral statements 
were used as stimuli. These types of stimuli represent a new methodological approach, at 
least for esthetic research. Sixteen right-handed subjects (9 female; mean age 28.25) with 
normal or corrected to normal vision participated. The main result suggests a common basis 
for the two judgment categories, revealing comparable neural networks mainly the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex. However, additional activations were found in the moral 
judgment condition, that is, in the posterior cingulate cortex, the precuneus, and the 
temporoparietal junction. These regions have been related to understanding the minds of 
others. The common network found suggests that up to a point the brain may not differentiate 
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between esthetic and moral evaluations. In order to make judgments the cognitive machinery 
relies on functions that include emotional, cognitive, and social processes, as well as their 
integration. It is possible that the differences appear after the integration. A possible 
mechanism through which this is possible on a neural level is discussed. 
 
2.3.2. Brief introduction of the thesis: Part II 
In the second section, published as Avram et al. (2014), the fMRI methodology was used in 
order to investigate, whether moral judgments in either a first- or third-person perspective are 
supported by different neural substrates. Sixteen right-handed subjects (9 female; mean age 
28.25) with normal or corrected to normal vision participated. The results indicate that 
different neural mechanisms appear to be involved in these perspectives. Although 
conjunction analysis revealed common activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, the 
third-person perspective elicited unique activations in hippocampus and visual cortex. The 
common activation can be explained by the role the anterior medial prefrontal cortex may 
play in integrating different information types and also by its involvement in theory of mind. 
Our results also indicate that the so-called "actor-observer bias" affects moral evaluation in 
the third-person perspective, possibly due to the involvement of the hippocampus. We 
suggest two possible ways in which the hippocampus may support the process of moral 
judgment: by the engagement of episodic memory and its role in understanding the behaviors 
and emotions of others. 
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